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Intergenerational Top Income Mobility in Sweden: 
A Combination of Equal Opportunity and Capitalistic Dynasties
*
 
This paper presents new evidence on intergenerational income and earnings mobility in the 
top of the distributions. Using a large dataset of matched father-son pairs in Sweden we are 
able to obtain results for fractions as small as 0.1 percent of the population. Overall, mobility 
is lower for incomes than for earnings and it appears to decrease the higher up in the 
distribution one goes. In the case of incomes, however, we find that mobility decreases 
dramatically within the top percentile of the population. Our results suggest that Sweden, 
well-known for its egalitarian achievements, is a society where equality of opportunity for a 
large majority of wage earners coexists with capitalistic dynasties. 
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“Our finance minister is the enemy of the millionaire and a friend of the multimillionaire.” 
 Anonymous Swedish economist on the Swedish tax 
system in the early 1970s (Sandford 1971, p. 152) 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper studies intergenerational income mobility focusing on top income earners in Swe-
den. More precisely, we study the income association of matched father-son pairs, where the 
sons are a representative sample of all men born in 1960-1967. The fact that our sample con-
sists of more than 100,000 pairs (35 percent of the whole population) means that we are able 
to get good precision estimates for fractions as small as the top 0.1 percent of the income dis-
tribution. 
 
There are two main motivations for this study. The first is based on the growing literature on 
top income shares over the long run.
1 While initially driven by a lack of comparable long-run 
series of inequality, this literature has also shown the importance of studying the top in more 
detail in order to understand changes in overall inequality.
2 In particular, it has been shown 
that the recent surge in inequality in many countries has been driven mainly by large income 
increases in the top percent (or even smaller fractions). However, so far this literature has not 
been able to answer questions about mobility. Mobility is just as crucial for evaluating the 
increase in top income inequality as it is for inequality in general. Indeed, when asked about 
the fairness of high income concentration, most people respond that it crucially depends on 
how those in the top got there. If success depends on “hard work” or “willingness to take 
risk”, people seem to tolerate inequality – even high degrees of it. If, on the other hand, the 
                                                 
1 Starting with Piketty (2001), Atkinson (2004), and Piketty and Saez (2003), a number of studies have followed 
using a common methodology to create homogenous series of top income shares over the long run for a number 
of mainly industrialized countries. Roine and Waldenström (2008) and Gustafsson and Jansson (2008) study the 
Swedish case. Atkinson and Piketty (2007) survey much of this work, its methodology and main findings. 
2 For example, the top income literature has shown that the top decile is typically a very heterogeneous group 
both in terms of income composition (though the composition has also changes over time for some groups) and 
in terms of the volatility of their income share. For most countries it also seems that most of the movement in the 
share of the top decile group is, in fact, driven by the top percent (something which runs the risk of not being 
captured if data is based on smaller, often top-coded samples. 
  2rich have reached their position because of inheritance, a certain family environment, or 
“connections and knowing the right people”, this is generally viewed as unfair.
3 Atkinson and 
Piketty (2007) point out that the change in top income composition in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
where top wage earners have replaced capital income earners, indicate that today’s income 
top is not primarily based on inherited wealth. This is supported by the findings in Kopczuk 
and Saez (2004), who show that the recent increase in income concentration in the U.S has 
not been accompanied by any major increase in wealth concentration, and by Edlund and 
Kopczuk (2008), who proxy wealth mobility in the U.S. by the share of women in the top of 
the distribution, and find that this share has decreased substantially over the past decades, also 
indicating a decreasing role for inheritance among the rich.
4 While these studies are indicative 
of changes in mobility, no previous study has been able to explicitly study intergenerational 
mobility of top incomes.
5
 
The second motivation for our study is an interest in the workings of the extensive welfare 
state. Broadly defined as having an exceptional commitment to economic security and egali-
tarianism, the “Nordic model” has received much attention and its achievements in equalizing 
income and mitigating poverty are well known.
6 What seems less well known is the fact that 
the financing of these welfare states has primarily rested on high average taxes rather than 
highly progressive taxes. Furthermore, this has been combined with relatively low capital 
taxes (at times even negative due to generous deductions) indicating a desire to combine high 
                                                 
3 The quotes are formulations from a Gallup pole used in Fong (2001), but there are many other examples of 
similar formulations in, for example, the World Values Survey, the General Social Survey, the International 
Social Survey, the International Social Justice Project, etc. Some studies have focused on the differences in per-
ceptions of why people are rich or poor, and, in particular on the differences between the US and Europe with 
respect to such beliefs (e.g., Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001, and Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). However, the 
opinion that if a person is rich as a consequence of working hard this is fair (and vice versa if the person has not 
made any effort) seems to be shared across countries. For example, Jencks and Tach (2006) report that a major-
ity of people in Germany, Japan, U.K. and the U.S. agreed with the statement that “[inequality] is fair but only if 
there are equal opportunities” (based on data collected by the International Social Justice Project (ISJP) in 1991). 
4 Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2007) study within lifetime income mobility in the U.S. and find that the probability 
of remaining in the top percent of the distribution from one period to the next has changed very little over the 
past decades. 
5 It may at first seem odd that we know so little about intergenerational income mobility at the top. However, 
when one considers the progress made in intergenerational income mobility research over the past 15 years it 
becomes less of a puzzle. A central insight in the work following Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) is that 
taking data requirements seriously is crucial for correctly estimating intergenerational mobility and when it 
comes to estimating life-time incomes for two generations focusing on fractions as small as 0.1 percent this re-
quires very large datasets. The only study we know of which has previously studied intergenerational mobility 
for fractions as small as the top percent of the distribution is by Corak and Heisz (1999) on Canadian data. 
6 See Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) for Nordic income distribution in international perspective, Lindbeck 
(1997) for an examination of the Swedish welfare state, and Björklund and Freeman (2008) for a recent over-
view of income equalization in Sweden. 
  3egalitarian ambitions with good investment incentives for large capital holders.
7 The extent to 
which this has been a strategy or a result of pragmatism in the face of increasing mobility of 
capital is debatable. It nevertheless gives rise to a number of interesting questions regarding 
mobility of Swedish top income earners. Is it the case that there are large differences in mobil-
ity when contrasting earnings and total income? If so, are these differences particularly impor-
tant in the top of the distribution? Is there evidence that equality of opportunity in Sweden has 
been conditional on not aspiring for the very top of the distribution?
8
 
Our study’s answer to all of these questions is “yes”. Using the same income concepts as in 
previous work on top incomes we find that: 1) intergenerational earnings mobility is generally 
higher than total income mobility, 2) mobility is generally smaller the higher up in the distri-
bution and, perhaps most importantly, 3) for total income it becomes exceptionally low at the 
very top of the distribution. In this sense Sweden does indeed seem to fit the picture of a soci-
ety where equality of opportunity for wage earners coexists with capitalistic dynasties. In line 
with previous studies of top incomes, our results also emphasize the need to study small frac-
tions of the population in order to fully understand income mobility.  
 
The rest of the paper continues with a presentation of econometric models in section 2, fol-
lowed by data description in section 3. Main results are reported in section 4, followed by 
sensitivity analyses in section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses topics for future research. 
2.  Econometric models 
Our point of departure is the prototypical model in intergenerational income mobility research 
 
   sif i yy i α βε = ++   (1) 
 
where ysi is the income of a son in family i and yfi the corresponding measure for his father. 
We strive for estimating the intergenerational relationship between long-run incomes follow-
ing the standard approach in the literature, and therefore use multi-year average incomes 
                                                 
7 For example, Steinmo (1993) and Lindert (2004) contain discussions of this as well as numerous references. 
8 Previous work on intergenerational mobility in Sweden suggests that mobility is in general comparatively high 
in Sweden (see Björklund and Jäntti, 2009, for a cross-national comparison). To the extent that previous work 
examines differences across the income distribution, the top group is defined as a rather broad group, such as the 
top-quintile group in Jäntti et al. (2006). 
  4throughout. We also control for father’s and son’s age (linearly and quadratically) in all our 
regressions. 
 
The regression coefficient β is the intergenerational elasticity, i.e., it measures the percentage 
differential in sons’ expected income with respect to a marginal percentage differential in the 
incomes of fathers. In case the variance of long-run incomes in both generations is the same, 
the elasticity is also the intergenerational correlation in log incomes. In our study, the distinc-
tion between the elasticity and the correlation is not relevant since we focus on the intergen-
erational transmission in the very top of the distributions. 
 
We extend equation (1) in two ways to address two different questions.
9 First, we use non-
linear regression by means of a spline function with knots (chosen by us), which are income 
levels in the distribution of fathers’ incomes at which the slope is allowed to change (see 
Greene, 1997, pp. 388f). In this way, when estimated on knots in the top of the distribution, 
our parameters show the percentage differential in sons’ expected income with respect to 
marginal differentials in the top of the fathers’ distribution. The specified model now looks as 
follows for knot k, which in our case simply is a level of income corresponding to a certain 
percentile p in the fathers’ distribution (in our estimations we include eight knots):  
 
  () sif i p f i p yy y k i α βδ =+ + − + ε
q
  (2) 
 
Our second approach is to use quantile regressions to analyze how sensitive the qth percentile 
in the sons’ income distribution is to the fathers’ incomes (see Koenker and Hallock, 2001). 
When q is a top income quantile, say the 99th percentile, our estimated parameter tells us how 
sensitive the top in sons’ income distribution is to differentials in fathers incomes. Thus we 




sif yy i i α βε = ++   (3) 
                                                 
9 Grawe (2004) uses a model that combines our two approaches, namely spline and quantile regression. How-
ever, this combination is not feasible for us as our focus on the very top of the distribution gives small samples. 
  53.  Data 
We use Swedish data compiled from administrative registers run by Statistics Sweden. First, 
we use the multi-generational register to connect biological fathers and their sons. We then 
use income registers to add income and earnings data, based on compulsory reports from em-
ployers to tax authorities or from personal tax returns. 
 
The starting point for constructing our population is a random sample of 35 percent of all men 
born in Sweden between 1960 and 1967. These are the sons in our study and we observe their 
incomes during 1996-2005, i.e., when they are in their 30s and early 40s. This is a period in 
life when even annual incomes are shown to be unbiased proxies for lifetime income with 
only classical measurement errors (Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006). Yet, we average their 
annual incomes over the entire ten-year period in order to eliminate a large part of the transi-
tory fluctuations.  
 
When measuring fathers’ incomes, we also want a good proxy for long-run income. There are, 
however, also arguments for measuring income at the time when their children grew up since 
this captures important determinants of the intergenerational transmission of incomes. In fact, 
several previous studies in the intergenerational literature have chosen to measure fathers’ 
incomes in this way.
10 When measuring fathers’ incomes in Sweden, the choice of years is 
restricted by the fact that consistent income data are available only from 1974 onwards.
11 For 
this reason, we measure parental income as the average of income during the years 1974-
1979, i.e., when their sons were between seven and nineteen years old and thus mostly living 
with their parents. 
 
We use two concepts of income. The first is total income, which is income from all sources 
(labor, business, capital and realized capital gains) before taxes and transfers.
12 This is the 
same measure as the top income studies have used when studying the evolution of top income 
shares.
13 Our estimates of the intergenerational mobility in the top, hence, correspond directly 
                                                 
10 See Corak (2006) and Björklund and Jäntti (2009) for recent surveys. 
11 Although we observe incomes since 1968, there was a legal change in 1973-74 that made a set of social insur-
ance benefits taxable and from then on also included in the income data. As a consequence, to get fully compa-
rable measures of income and earnings we choose 1974 as our starting date. 
12 Total income (sammanräknad nettoinkomst for fathers and summa förvärvs- och kapitalinkomst for sons) also 
includes taxable social insurance benefits such as unemployment insurance, pensions, sickness pay and parental 
leave benefits. 
13 See Roine and Waldenström (2008). 
  6to their estimates of the static inequality in the income top. Our second measure is earnings, 
which includes income from work for employees and self-employed.
14
 
Several specific problems arise when measuring incomes and earnings in the absolute top of 
the distribution. We feel broadly confident with the Swedish register data used in this study – 
for example there is no such thing as top coding in the income and earnings registers. Yet 
there are two important sources of measurement error that potentially influence our results.
15  
 
First, our earnings measure never includes capital incomes even though items such as bonuses 
and realized stock options can be a relatively important form of compensation to top earners. 
To the extent that such capital-based reimbursements have become more prevalent since the 
1970s, which is arguably the case in Sweden, we systematically underestimate top earnings 
among sons. Since this mismeasurement of the dependent variable ought to be positively cor-
related with father’s earnings, we are at risk of biasing the estimated relationship downwards 
and overestimating earnings mobility across generations.  
 
Second, after Sweden around 1990 liberalized its capital account there has been a drastic in-
crease in cross-border capital movements among the wealthy. In a recent survey of the Swed-
ish household wealth concentration, Roine and Waldenström (2009) show that significant 
shares of wealth owned by the richest Swedes may be placed in off-shore locations. As a re-
sult, capital income among high-income earning sons could be underestimated. Since meas-
urement error is likely to be positively correlated with fathers’ earnings, we risk overestimat-
ing intergenerational income mobility. Altogether, we may not fully capture all incomes and 
earnings accruing to the top, which could bias our results. Fortunately, the biases all go in the 
same direction, namely that we tend to overestimate intergenerational mobility and especially 
so in the very top of the distribution. 
 
                                                 
14 Earnings (arbetsinkomst) is an income concept created by Statistics Sweden by combing wages and salaries 
and business income. It also includes earnings-related short-term sickness benefits and parental-leave benefits 
but not unemployment and (early) retirement benefits. 
15 Statistics Sweden’s income and earnings data rely on personal tax assessments through 1977 for wages, sala-
ries, and transfers, and through 1987 for interests and dividends. Thereafter reports come from employers (and 
authorities for transfers) and banks respectively. Thus, our sons’ data come from employers and banks and most 
of our fathers’ data come from personal reports. Most likely, the latter source introduces some measurement 
error in fathers’ income resulting in an underestimation of intergenerational transmission, and consequently, an 
overestimation of mobility.  
  7When determining the population used in the estimations, we begin by requiring fathers to be 
residents all the years 1974-1979 and sons in all the years 1996-2005. We then use separate 
samples for income and earnings and use only the son-father pairs for whom both had positive 
income observations each observation year, and do correspondingly in the earnings sample.
16 
For reasons that we will return to, we are somewhat concerned about the presence of observa-
tions with zero income and earnings, and therefore perform some sensitivity analyses to ex-
amine whether our basic conclusions are sensitive to the treatment of these observations. 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for fathers in the two samples of our main analysis. Our 
income sample contains 130,047 pairs of fathers and sons and the earnings sample contains 
101,635 pairs.
17 Thus we observe more than thousand father-son pairs in the top income per-
centile and over one hundred in the top 0.1 percentile group.
18 The mean and median are 
about the same for income and earnings. Top incomes are substantially higher than top earn-
ings, with the highest income observation being 2-3 times larger than the highest earnings 
observation. This difference clearly underscores the importance of large capital incomes for 
top incomes. The age of fathers is somewhat higher in the income sample, which is plausible 





In Table 2, we report similar characteristics for sons. The levels of inequality are quite differ-
ent across both generations and income concepts. In the case of total incomes, the coefficient 
of variation increased from around 0.5 for fathers to over 1.0 for sons and the standard devia-
tion of the average of log incomes increased from 0.43 to 0.49. By contrast, the coefficient of 
variation for earnings increased only modestly from 0.48 for fathers to 0.57 for sons and the 
standard deviation of average of log earnings even fell from 0.56 to 0.49. These numbers are 
                                                 
16 Our income and earnings data come in units of 1 SEK for all but two years when they come in 100 SEK. We 
adjust for this in our analysis by multiplying incomes and earnings in the two latter years by 100. Still, there may 
be a concern that when taking logs of incomes near the lowest income limit the initial difference in limits could 
influence the results. Rerunning the main analysis requiring incomes and earnings to be at least 100 SEK instead 
of just being positive, however, the results (available upon request) do not change. 
17 These numbers can be compared to 151,148 sons who were born in Sweden in 1960-67 and resided in Sweden 
all years 1996-2005, that is, the population we want to make inferences about. Table A1 explains how the sample 
changes depending on the requirements we have. 
18 As a striking comparison, note that Solon (1992) in his seminal study for the United States had some 250 pairs 
of fathers and sons who lived together in the same PSID household in 1968.  
19 We checked whether the fact that fathers in the income sample are relatively older influence the results, but 
found that they did not by running the analysis using only fathers aged 65 or less in both populations (results are 
available upon request). 
  8in line with the previously documented trends for top income shares in Sweden, which indi-
cate sharp increases for total income but only moderate changes for earnings (see Roine and 
Waldenström, 2008, for details). 
[Table 2] 
4.  Results 
Our main results are reported in Table 3. The conventional least squares regression model (1) 
yields estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of 0.262 for income and 0.169 for earnings. 
While this difference between income and earnings might appear as striking, it should be no-
ticed that they also differ in terms of trends in dispersion. Specifically, using information from 
data in the above section 3, the ratio of the standard deviation of fathers’ and sons’ long-run 
incomes fell by 12 percent (0.43/0.49) and the corresponding ratio increased by 14 percent 
(0.56/0.49) for earnings. In other words, the intergenerational correlations (defined as the es-
timated intergenerational elasticities multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviations) are 





Next, we turn to the pattern in the top of the distribution. The results using the spline specifi-
cation (2) indicate a clear non-linear pattern in the persistence of sons’ incomes in different 
levels of fathers’ incomes or earnings. Specifically, in the lowest quartile, the generational 
dependency is almost absent, with regression coefficients of 0.106 for incomes and 0.042 for 
earnings. For fathers between the 25th and 99th percentiles, generational persistence is higher. 
Coefficient estimates vary between 0.16 and 0.42, with the highest coefficient for incomes in 
the “upper middle class”, i.e., between the median and 90th percentile. The most striking find-
ing, however, is that the persistence increases drastically in the absolute income top. For fa-
thers with incomes in the top 0.1 percentile, we estimate a coefficient of 0.827 with a standard 
error as low as 0.099. Taken at face value, this coefficient implies that a 10 percent income 
differential among high-income fathers is transmitted into an 8.3 percent differential among 
sons. This should be contrasted against the average transmission found in model (1), which is 
only 2.6 percent. 
 
  9In the quantile regressions (3), we examine how sensitive sons’ incomes and earnings at dif-
ferent levels are to their fathers’ incomes and earnings. Here, the results reveal basically the 
same non-linear patterns as we saw in the spline regression analysis. In the case of incomes, 
there is a somewhat smoother increase in the degree of persistence across generation over the 
level of sons’ incomes. The median regression, q50, has an intergenerational elasticity of 
0.233. This is lower than in the OLS regression, but that is expected given the skewness of the 
income distribution. Already by the 75th quantile, we observe coefficients of 0.296 and for 
q99-coefficient it is 0.381, which implies that a 10 percent income differential among fathers 
is related to a 3.8 percent higher income for sons’ at the 99th quantile of the distribution. Go-
ing even further up the income distribution, we find a coefficient of 0.531 at q99.9, which is 
markedly higher than elsewhere in the distribution.  
 
Turning to earnings, we find qualitatively similar patterns but a much weaker increase in per-
sistence toward the top. The coefficients at the top are only half as large as they are for in-
come. This difference among income and earnings suggests that it is the capital income com-
ponent that is strongly inherited at the very top of the distribution. 
 
Altogether, while our results corroborate previous findings on average Swedish income mo-
bility they also highlight new evidence on notable non-linearities in this relationship across 
the distribution of income. Specifically, we find mobility to be high among low-income earn-
ers but that it diminishes notably in the middle-income classes. In the absolute top of the dis-
tribution we find remarkably low levels of income mobility. Among fathers in the top 0.1 per-
centile there is almost no intergenerational mobility at all. 
 
These non-linear mobility patterns also prevail in the earnings distribution, but to a much 
lesser extent. There even seems to be a considerable equality of opportunity for wage earners 
in the Swedish economy, with low-wage earning fathers transmitting almost none of their 
earnings status to their sons. In the absolute top, earnings mobility is only slightly higher than 
mobility at the income median. Possibly this relatively high level of mobility in the earnings 
top could in part be due to the omission of capital incomes accruing to high-wage earning 
sons, which, as discussed above, leads to an overestimation of earnings mobility. 
  105.  Sensitivity analyses 
We now turn to sensitivity analyses. First, we ask whether the interesting difference in results 
for income and earnings is driven by the fact that the estimations in Table 3 were done on two 
different samples. In panel Table 4a, we report estimates for the same models as in Table 3, 
but on requiring that fathers had both positive incomes and positive earnings each year 1974-
1979 (giving us the same sample when estimating earnings and incomes, respectively). The 
results are similar to those in our main specification. If anything, coefficients in the very top 





The motivation for the other sensitivity analyses is that we are concerned about the interpreta-
tion of observations with zero annual income (or earnings). On one hand, both income and 
earnings might correctly be zero. In particular, our register information might correctly report 
zero earnings income for a person who has studied the whole year, been unemployed the 
whole year or left the labor force (for retirement or something else) for the whole year. In 
some of these cases, in particular unemployment, retirement and long-term sickness, we could 
expect the person to collect some taxable social transfers but not necessarily for those who 
study. On the other hand, there is also a possibility that income or earnings in our data is re-
corded zero by mistake. One example is if the tax declaration process is not completed and 
subject to a judicial process.  
 
Our strategy is to make two extreme assumptions about the possible nature of the zero income 
observations and investigate whether our main results would change substantially. Looking 
first at the case where we treat the zero income/earnings observations as being incorrect and 





Finally, treating the zero income/earnings observations as being correct we calculate the log 
of average income for all years treating zeros as just zeros. As can be seen in Table 4c, this 
  11does not seem to change the main results either. This approach, however, also involves the 
change of functional form since we now use the log of average income for all years instead of 
the average of the log of annual income observations. In order to investigate whether this 
change is important, we go back to the assumption in Table 4b and treat zero observations as 
incorrect but use the log of the average of income instead of the average of the log. The re-





6.  Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
Analogously to the top income literature, a first general conclusion that can be drawn from 
our results is that it is crucial to study small fractions in the top of the distribution to get a 
clear picture of income mobility. Discussing “the top” as consisting of the top 20, or top 10, 
or even the top 5 percent, runs the risk of missing important aspects. Indeed, our most striking 
results do not show until within the top percentile. Furthermore, as is also suggested by the 
top income literature, it is important to separate different sources of income, in particular to 
separate between earnings and income including capital income.   
 
While our results are clear in showing higher persistence in total income mobility compared 
to earnings mobility, as well as in showing sharp increases in persistence for the very top 
groups, some questions still remain in terms of interpretation. First, and most importantly, we 
can not distinguish the “qualitative source” of capital incomes. The concepts of capital in-
come and realized capital gains may both contain income from stock options or the sale of a 
company built by the individual who reports the income, as well as income flowing from in-
herited capital. The former are connected to an individuals work efforts while the latter are 
based on inheritance of wealth. Typically we would like to distinguish these when making 
interpretations. Importantly though, the fact that top capital incomes may be related to work 
effort, does not alter the fact that those who receive such compensation also had fathers with 
similar positions in the income distribution. Second, the fact that we focus on persons residing 
in Sweden over the period means that our estimates do not include those who have chosen to 
move abroad. To the extent that such moves have, for example, been more common among 
  12individuals who have made their own fortunes, these “mobile” top income earners are not 
captured in our sample. Again, this does not take away the result that among those who reside 
in Sweden persistence in the top is very high.  
 
Our results suggest several interesting avenues for further research. To begin with, we have 
followed much of the previous research and confined the analysis to men. Obviously, it would 
be interesting to incorporate mothers and daughters too. It would also be fascinating to con-
sider the role of parents-in-law and thus assortative mating in a study of intergenerational in-
heritance of top incomes and earnings. Chadwick and Solon (2002) have shown that this can 
be done in a straightforward way by using family income of parents and offspring.  
 
Finally, our results can at present be given two different comparative interpretations. Either 
the combination of high overall earnings mobility and extremely high income persistence in 
the top is a unique feature of the extensive welfare state, perhaps even a consequence of the 
particular “Nordic model”, or, alternatively, income persistence in the top is just as high, or 
even higher, in societies like the U.S. where overall mobility is lower than in Sweden. Deter-
mining which is right requires studies of top income mobility for other countries. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for main income and earnings samples, fathers. 
Variable  Concept  Mean  S.D.  Min P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 Max 
Income 40.6  7.3  22 35 40 45 51 54 60  81 
Age in 1974 
Earnings  40.2  6.9  22 35 39 45 50 53 58  76 
Income  247  144  .1 181 217 276 373 464 785  9,882 
1974 
Earnings  244  129  .0 183 219 277 373 460 761  3,747 
Income  252  140  .3 187 226 287 382 471 757 12,263 
1979 
Earnings  258  130  .3 194 231 292 386 474 747  4,573 
Income  254  137  3.1 189 225 283 380 468 764 13,950 
Ave(74-79) 
Earnings  256  124  1.4 194 228 287 383 468 748  4,467 
Income  12.34 0.43 7.74 12.14 12.32 12.55 12.84 13.05 13.53  16.39 
Ave(ln74-ln79) 
Earnings  12.32 0.56 5.70 12.16 12.33 12.56 12.85 13.05 13.51  15.24 
Note: The income (earnings) sample consists of father-son pairs with positive income (earnings) all years. In-
comes and earnings are in thousand 2005 SEK. Observations are 130,047 (incomes) and 101,635 (earnings). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for main income and earnings samples, sons. 
Variable  Concept  Mean  S.D.  Min P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 Max 
Income  32.3  2.3  29 30 32 34 36 36 36  36  Age in 1996 
Earnings  32.3  2.3  29 30 32 34 36 36 36  36 
Income  236 201  .0 179 223 273 346 411 594  37,113  1996 
Earnings  236 118  .0 187 231 281 352 412 569  7,158 
Income  329  1,328  .0 216 267 342 476 594  1,125  347,553  2000 
Earnings  310 232  .0 228 276 352 474 572 901  27,566 
Income  354 423  .0 237 297 388 544 691  1,311  45,223  2005 
Earnings  350 229  .0 250 308 400 546 676  1,099  10,802 
Income  303 316  .2 217 263 333 452 557 936  43,346  Ave(96-05) 
Earnings  302 171  1.6 224 271 342 455 544 820  13,051 
Income  12.45  0.49 3.13 12.25 12.46 12.69 12.98 13.18 13.60  17.50  Ave(ln96-ln06) 
Earnings  12.46  0.49 5.94 12.28 12.49 12.72 13.00 13.17 13.56  16.10 
Note: See table 1.
  16Table 3: Main results for basic samples. N=130,047 (incomes); N=101,635 (earnings).. 
Income: OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.262         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.189 0.233 0.296 0.331 0.338 0.381 0.531 
    (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.033) 
  p<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.106 0.352 0.347 0.422 0.260 0.222 0.344 0.827 
    (0.007) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.051) (0.034) (0.073) (0.099) 
          
Earnings OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.169         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.154 0.158 0.170 0.169 0.160 0.164 0.252 
    (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) 
  p<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.042 0.417 0.398 0.409 0.291 0.157 0.319 0.355 
    (0.004) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.061) (0.041) (0.091) (0.160) 
Note: All models reported in this and the following tables are estimated with linear and quadratic controls for 
father’s and son’s age. Corresponding to our models q and p are short for quantile and percentile respectively. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and in the quantile regressions, these are bootstrapped using 30 replications. 
 
Table 4a) Same sample for income and earnings. Positive income and earnings each year for both sons 
and fathers. N=101,519. 
Income: OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.294         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.186 0.273 0.352 0.379 0.388 0.466 0.630 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.033) 
  p<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.097 0.351 0.377 0.440 0.286 0.243 0.400 0.741 
    (0.009) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.049) (0.032) (0.068) (0.092) 
          
Earnings OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.168         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.154 0.158 0.170 0.169 0.160 0.164 0.252 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.021) 
  p<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.042 0.417 0.397 0.409 0.287 0.163 0.313 0.357 
  (0.004) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.061) (0.041) (0.091) (0.160) 
 Note: See table 3. 
  17 Table 4b) Treat zero income/earnings observations as incorrect: Exclude zero income years and use 
average of log income for remaining years. N=142,046 (incomes); N=139,210 (earnings). 
Income: OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.251         
  (0.004)         
Quantile    0.208 0.218 0.256 0.279 0.267 0.268 0.312 
    (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.025) 
  p<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.119 0.506 0.292 0.433 0.200 0.121 0.398 0.919 
    (0.007) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.064) (0.043) (0.090) (0.117) 
          
Earnings OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.134         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.167 0.109 0.105 0.118 0.117 0.120 0.165 
    (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) 
  p<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.011 0.638 0.407 0.461 0.302 0.073 0.367 0.547 
    (0.004) (0.032) (0.038) (0.041) (0.079) (0.053) (0.120) (0.202) 
Note: See table 3. 
 
Table 4c) Treat zero income/earnings observations as correct. Use the log of average income for all 
years treating zeros as just zeros. N=142,046 (incomes); N=139,158 (earnings). 
Income: OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.269         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.208 0.227 0.271 0.289 0.278 0.275 0.324 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.026) 
  p<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.099 0.512 0.373 0.471 0.303 0.169 0.605 0.690 
    (0.007) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.061) (0.041) (0.084) (0.102) 
          
Earnings OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.145         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.165 0.112 0.121 0.125 0.120 0.129 0.175 
    (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.016) 
  p<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.026 0.452 0.515 0.441 0.354 0.081 0.291 0.607 
    (0.004) (0.032) (0.039) (0.043) (0.082) (0.055) (0.126) (0.204) 
Note: See table 3. 
  18Table 4d) Treat zero income/earnings observations as incorrect. Use the log of average income for all 
years treating zeros as just zeros. N=142,046 (incomes); N=139,158 (earnings). 
Income: OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.287         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.213 0.245 0.304 0.334 0.342 0.379 0.422 
    (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.018) (0.022) 
  P<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.112 0.454 0.377 0.454 0.345 0.165 0.600 0.693 
    (0.007) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.055) (0.036) (0.074) (0.085) 
          
Earnings OLS  q25  q50  q75  q90  q95  q99  q99.9 
OLS  0.185         
  (0.003)         
Quantile    0.194 0.158 0.171 0.174 0.162 0.176 0.218 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.023) 
  P<25 25<p<50 50<p<75 75<p<90 90<p<95 95<p<99 99<p<99.9 99.9<p 
Spline  0.041 0.513 0.420 0.446 0.350 0.098 0.314 0.535 
    (0.005) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.065) (0.044) (0.099) (0.159) 
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Table A1: Structure of attrition. 
  Number of observations 
  Income Earnings 
1. All sons, born in Sweden in 1960-67 and part of the multigenerational regis-
ter, registered as living in Sweden all years 1996-2005.  151,148 151,148 
2. All sons in 1 and with at least one positive income (earnings) observation.  150,902  148,612 
3. All sons in 1 and with 10 positive income (earnings) observations.  142,716  126,045 
4. All sons in 3 with a known biological father.  140,710  124,379 
5. All sons in 4 with a biological father who was registered in Sweden all years 
1974-1979.  134,673 119,300 
6. All sons in 5 with a biological father who has at least one positive income 
(earnings) observation.  134,599 118,638 
7. All sons in 6 with a biological father who has positive income (earnings) 
observations all years 1974-1979.  130,047 101,635 
 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for main income and earnings samples, fathers. 
Variable  Concept  Mean  S.D.  Min P25 P50 P75 P90 P95  P99 Max 
Income 40.6  7.3  22 35 40 45 51 54  60  81 
Age in 1974 
Earnings  40.2  6.9  22 35 39 45 50 53  58  76 
Income  247  144  .1 181 217 276 373 464  785  9,882 
1974 
Earnings  244  129  .0 183 219 277 373 460  761  3,747 
Income  259  170  .8 190 228 290 389 484  805 24,512 
1975 
Earnings  257  136  .0 193 230 292 389 478  778  7,500 
Income  261  154  .1 193 232 293 393 486  798 16,098 
1976 
Earnings  263  134  .0 200 237 298 395 484  780  4,654 
Income  255  145  .1 189 228 289 387 477  776 13,240 
1977 
Earnings  257  132  .0 195 232 293 389 475  757  6,021 
Income  251  146  .3 186 224 284 381 470  765 16,715 
1978 
Earnings  257  127  .3 193 229 289 384 471  751  5,432 
Income  252  140  .3 187 226 287 382 471  757 12,263 
1979 
Earnings  258  130  .3 194 231 292 386 474  747  4,573 
Income  254  137  3.1 189 225 283 380 468  764 13,950 
Ave(74-79) 
Earnings  256  124  1.4 194 228 287 383 468  748  4,467 
Income  12.34  0.43 7.74 12.14 12.32 12.55 12.84 13.05  13.53  16.39 
Ave(ln74-ln79) 
Earnings  12.32  0.56 5.70 12.16 12.33 12.56 12.85 13.05  13.51  15.24 
Note: The income (earnings) sample consists of father-son pairs with positive income (earnings) all years. In-
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics for main income and earnings samples, sons. 
Variable  Concept  Mean  S.D.  Min P25 P50 P75 P90 P95  P99 Max 
Income  32.3  2.3  29 30 32 34 36 36  36  36  Age in 1996 
Earnings  32.3  2.3  29 30 32 34 36 36  36  36 
Income  236  201  .0 179 223 273 346 411  594 37,113  1996 
Earnings  236  118  .0 187 231 281 352 412  569  7,158 
Income  252  291  .0 187 233 287 371 443  672 56,278  1997 
Earnings  251  134  .0 197 241 296 377 443  626  9,530 
Income  270  254  .0 197 244 304 402 486  759 23,801  1998 
Earnings  271  177  .0 209 255 315 409 486  707 22,235 
Income  292  415  .0 206 255 322 437 539  919 65,061  1999 
Earnings  288  182  .0 219 264 331 438 525  789 13,271 
Income  329  1,328  .0 216 267 342 476 594  1,125  347,553  2000 
Earnings  310  232  .0 228 276 352 474 572  901 27,566 
Income  320  532  .0 220 272 350 485 600  1,037 85,931  2001 
Earnings  323  284  .1 234 283 365 495 601  976 29,412 
Income  323  464  .0 224 277 357 492 606  1,029 47,842  2002 
Earnings  327  243  .0 237 289 372 503 611  980 26,369 
Income  323  407  .0 226 280 360 494 611  1,035 69,290  2003 
Earnings  328  201  .0 239 292 375 505 614  979  9,529 
Income  336  491  .0 231 288 372 513 641  1,115 69,843  2004 
Earnings  337  212  .0 244 299 386 522 641  1,032 11,073 
Income  354  423  .0 237 297 388 544 691  1,311 45,223  2005 
Earnings  350  229  .0 250 308 400 546 676  1,099 10,802 
Income  303  316  .2 217 263 333 452 557  936 43,346  Ave(96-05) 
Earnings  302  171  1.6 224 271 342 455 544  820 13,051 
Income  12.45  0.49 3.13 12.25 12.46 12.69 12.98 13.18  13.60  17.50  Ave(ln96-ln06) 
Earnings  12.46  0.49 5.94 12.28 12.49 12.72 13.00 13.17  13.56  16.10 
Note: See table 1. 
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